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ALSTON ON THE RATIONALITY OF  
DOXASTIC PRACTICES: A RESPONSE TO JOHN TURRI
William Hasker
John Turri claims to have refuted the main argument of William Alston’s 
Perceiving God. He contests Alston’s claim that “for any established doxastic 
practice it is rational to suppose that it is reliable.” I show that Turri has mis-
interpreted Alston at several key points, and that his refutation of Alston’s 
argument fails.
Given the magnitude of William Alston’s achievement in Perceiving God,1 it 
is surprising to find an article which in a very few pages both summarizes 
his main argument and offers a refutation of it. Yet that is what John Turri 
has done in this journal.2 I shall endeavor to be as concise as Turri in ex-
plaining why the refutation fails. I shall argue that he has misunderstood 
Alston at several crucial points; in addition, he has simply failed to grasp 
the force of a central argument of Alston’s.
First, however, a very brief summary of Alston’s program in Perceiv-
ing God. Alston’s concern is to argue that the perception of God confers 
epistemic justification on certain beliefs about God—specifically, upon “M-
beliefs,” beliefs about the way God is manifesting himself to a subject in 
a given experience (e.g., comforting or guiding), or about some perceiv-
able property of God (e.g., power or lovingness). Alston approaches this 
through a “doxastic practice” epistemo logy, where the central question is 
which of our doxastic (belief-forming) practices are generally reliable and 
thus capable of conferring justification on the beliefs formed through them. 
(Alston in this book adopts a reliabilist view of justification.) Alston main-
tains that with regard to our basic doxastic practices, we simply are not in 
a position to establish in a non-circular way that the prac tices are reliable. 
However, we are “practically rational” in engaging in any socially estab-
lished doxastic practice and in regarding it as reliable, in the absence of 
successful defeaters, given that certain additional requirements (e.g., “self-
support”) are met. Alston argues that the “Christian mystical practice” 
1William Alston, Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1991). References will be given in the text with “A” followed by the page 
number.
2John Turri, “Practical and Epistemic Justification in Alston’s Perceiving God,” Faith and 
Philosophy 25.3 (July 2008), pp. 290–299. References will be given in the text with “T” fol-
lowed by the page number.
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(CMP), which forms beliefs about God on the basis of the perception of 
God, meets these additional tests and should be accepted as epistemically 
rational, and as conferring justification on beliefs about God.
Already with regard to Alston’s objective, Turri begins to go astray. He 
writes, “M-beliefs could be justified only if putative perceptions of God 
reliably indicate that God is φ. In turn, this entails that M-beliefs could 
be justified only if God exists, for God could be φ only if God exists. The 
stakes could hardly be higher: if Alston’s argument succeeds, then he will 
have established that God exists” (T290).
Now compare this with Alston’s own statement concerning his aims:
I do not aspire to prove the genuineness of perception of God; that would 
require that we prove the existence of God and his causal role in producing 
the experiences in question. The aim is rather to rebut objections to the con-
viction of the subjects that they are directly aware of God, and to point out 
that if their conviction is correct they are also properly taken to be perceiving 
God. (A5, bolding added) 
The contrast couldn’t be clearer: what Turri says Alston will have estab-
lished, if his argument succeeds, is precisely what Alston says he does 
not aspire to establish!3 There is another problem with Turri’s approach 
that is closely related to this one: Turri fails to grasp accurately the way in 
which Alston’s argument is directed at different groups of people. Turri 
observes, correctly, that the argument is directed at the “community of 
epistemologists and interested parties” (T291), whether or not they are 
practitioners of CMP. But he fails to grasp the point that, with regard to 
non-practitioners of CMP, Alston’s aim is to “rebut objections” rather than 
to prove to them that CMP is reliable. He may hope to persuade them to 
accept it as reliable, but he does not undertake to demonstrate that it is, as 
Turri implies.
Turri formulates Alston’s overall argument in a series of fourteen num-
bered steps. However, only the first two are germane for our purposes, 
since Turri’s objection aims to block the argument early on. Here are those 
two steps, as formulated by Turri:
(1) If CMP is a socially established doxastic practice, then it is prima facie 
practically rational to engage in it. (Premise)
(2) If it is prima facie practically rational to engage in CMP, then it is pri-
ma facie epistemically rational to regard CMP as a reliable doxastic 
practice. (Premise) (T291)
I believe Turri is generally correct in identifying these as premises of 
Alston’s argument.4 Note, however, that in spite of the mention here of 
3Later on (T294), Turri admits himself baffled by Alston’s admission that “We have not 
shown the reliability attribution to be rational in a truth-conducive sense of rationality” 
(A180). But shouldn’t this “baffling” remark have led Turri to reconsider his original assess-
ment of Alston’s objective for his argument?
4Actually I have a small quibble with his formulation of (2). I believe “epistemically ra-
tional” in (2) should be replaced simply by “rational”; this would match the quotation from 
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CMP, the points in contention do not apply to CMP any more than to any 
other doxastic practice. If premise (2) is flawed, as Turri argues, then the 
correspon ding premises with regard to other practices such as sense-per-
ception and memory will likewise be flawed. What will follow, then, is not 
that CMP has any special problem but rather that the defense of the ra-
tionality of any doxastic practice whatever must follow a different course 
than the one laid out by Alston. 
But why, according to Turri, should (2) be rejected? He makes the point 
that “There is good reason to deny that practical justification provides evi-
dence for reliability” and goes on to provide examples:
Perhaps some unremarkable people can be happy and successful only if 
they falsely believe that they possess stunning looks, an incomparable intel-
lect, or devastating charm. . . . [P]ecuniary self-interest no doubt perpetuated 
the belief among many nineteenth-century slaveholders that black people 
were inherently inferior, naturally fit for slavery, indeed improved by the 
institution of slavery. (T292)
Here, however, Turri is guilty of a serious misunderstanding: he is confus-
ing practical rationality with prudential justification. Prudential justification 
does indeed encourage beliefs which are conducive to one’s self-interest, 
regardless of their truth or falsity, just as in Turri’s examples. It is clear, 
however, that when we are evaluating doxastic practices from the stand-
point of Alston’s “practical rationality,” the goal we are to have in mind is 
truth rather than self-interest—in Alston’s own words, “the aim at maxi-
mizing the number of one’s true beliefs and minimizing the number of 
one’s false beliefs” (A72). In the discussion of doxastic practices leading up 
to the introduction of practical rationality (A146–173), one looks in vain 
for any consideration of self-interest (or any other non-epistemic motive) 
in contrast with truth as a goal of the epistemic endeavor.5 This point is 
further supported precisely by the relationship Alston asserts (and Turri 
contests) between practical rationality and the presumption of reliability. 
Alston is scarcely so negligent as to overlook the fact that sometimes ways 
of believing that are conducive to self-interest stray far from the truth!
What then is practical rationality, if it does not imply a primary concern 
for prudential self-interest? Alston does not give an explicit definition, but 
I believe the following formula captures the idea fairly closely: 
(PR) One is practically rational in engaging in a doxastic practice if, 
even though we are unable to prove that the practice is reliable, 
Alston which Turri cites in support of (2): “for any established doxastic practice it is rational 
to suppose that it is reliable” (A183, cited on T297 n. 5). But this point is not crucial for the 
subsequent discussion.
5Alston states, “I call this rationality ‘practical’ to differentiate it from the rationality we 
would show to attach to . . . a doxastic practice if sufficient grounds were given for regarding 
it as reliable” (A168). Here the difference between the cases is not a difference in the goals 
aimed at—in one case, truth, in the other, self-interest. Rather, the difference concerns the 
epistemic support for the practice in question: whether we are, or are not, able to adduce “suf-
ficient grounds . . . for regarding it as reliable.”
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it seems to be the most promising available method (or one of the 
most promising) for getting at the truth concerning matters that 
are of importance to us.
“Practical” here has to do with the “practical decision” to engage in the 
practice, rather than adopting some competing practice or refraining alto-
gether from forming beliefs about the subject-matter in question.6 (Alston 
considers the objection that in the case of some practices, such as sense-
perception, we are actually unable to refrain and have no competing al-
ternatives available to us. He replies that it suffices that we can imagine 
competing practices, even if, for various reasons, these practices would 
be impossible or forbiddingly difficult to implement (see A168).) The im-
portance of a practice being socially established consists in (at least) two 
factors: On the one hand, “It is a reasonable supposition that a practice 
would not have persisted over large segments of the population unless it 
was putting people into effective touch with some aspect(s) of reality and 
proving itself as such by its fruits” (A170). Furthermore, it is a large ad-
vantage that the practice is “available” in one’s culture, so that if one is not 
already skilled in it, there are established practitioners who can instruct 
one in its use. (The importance of the latter point becomes apparent when 
one considers the immense labor often required to develop a new doxastic 
practice, for example modern experimental natural science.)
These considerations show that the beliefs cited by Turri are not ef-
fective counter examples to (2). To be sure, it is conceivable that someone 
might initially take the doxastic practices that generate those beliefs as 
practically rational. Eventually, however, sufficient defeaters will no doubt 
emerge that show those practices to be unreliable, and at this point the 
judgment of practical rationality will have to be withdrawn. Nevertheless, 
it certainly is not Alston’s view that every socially established doxas tic 
practice is reliable; astrology and divination would be relatively uncon-
troversial examples to the contrary. At this point, then, we need to look 
at Alston’s affirmative case for (2). According to Alston, “in judging SP 
[sense perception] to be rational I am committed to judging it to be ratio-
nal to suppose SP to be reliable” (A180).7 (Sense perception is merely an 
example here; the same principle applies to any doxastic practice, and in 
particular to CMP.) If someone denies this in a specific case, Alston argues, 
he is in a situation comparable to “Moore’s Paradox,” where a person says, 
“p is true, but I don’t believe p.” There is no contradiction here; there is 
nothing absurd about there being a truth that some person fails to believe. 
Nevertheless, one who affirms “p is true, but I don’t believe p,” is guilty of 
a serious conceptual confusion. One might say that in affirming (sincerely) 
6“A question of practical rationality arises only when we are dealing with what we do” 
(A174, italics in original).
7There is a nice point here. The practitioner of SP need not actually judge SP to be reliable; 
she may have no thoughts about the matter at all. Nevertheless, she is committed to “judging 
it to be rational to suppose SP to be reliable,” in that, if the question should arise, she cannot 
consistently refuse to make the judgment in question.
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that p is true, I display my belief that p; if then, in the next breath I deny 
(again sincerely) that I have this belief, I must be deeply confused.
Turri has no problem with Moore’s Paradox arguments as such, but he 
finds himself at a loss to discern how such an argument comes into play 
in this case. He asks us to 
Consider:
(15) It is practically rational to engage in α.
(16) I believe that α is reliable [or: α gives rise to mostly true beliefs].
Assenting to (15) while denying (16) does not suggest an epistemic failure. 
Neither does it strike me as odd or infelicitous. We as observers can con-
cede that α is a long-standing, socially established, widely accepted doxastic 
practice, and that people in certain circumstances can have overwhelming 
practical reason to participate in α. . . . How does this relate to whether 
the resulting α-beliefs are appropriate from the epistemic point of view? As 
far as I can see, it is irrelevant. Perhaps α prescribes hasty generalization 
or prejudicial bias, and neither procedure appears likely to generate true  
beliefs. (T293)
Now, what Turri says here is so far true. We as observers may see that a 
particular doxastic practice is socially established and so on, and so might 
conclude that for its participants it is practically rational to engage in. And 
we might still conclude that the practice is unreliable, for the sorts of rea-
sons Turri cites. So far, nothing is logically amiss. However, all this is be-
side the point, because Turri has mistaken the target of Alston’s argument. 
As we saw above, Alston’s aim is to defend the rationality of the participant 
in CMP (and in other doxastic practices), and the Moore’s Paradox argu-
ment has to be read from the standpoint of the participant. Turri’s objection, 
given above, is stated from our standpoint “as observers.” But “we as ob-
servers” do not in this case “judge the practice to be practically rational,” 
full stop. What we judge is that it is practically rational for its participants, 
persons who presumably are not aware of the reasons for which we right-
ly conclude the practice to be unreliable. But for us enlightened observers, 
the practice would not be practically rational.8 The reference to Moore’s 
Paradox should have been enough by itself to show that Turri’s objection 
is misdirected. There is, after all, nothing at all paradoxical about a per-
son’s asserting, “p is true, but you don’t believe p.”
Fortunately, Turri goes on to suggest that “Alston might have a point to 
make regarding a slightly different question, a ‘quasi-external’ question: 
why should we suppose that engaging in α will make it epistemically irra-
tional for the participants of α to deny that forming beliefs within α is likely 
to result in true beliefs?” (T293) Now, this is more promising. I believe, 
for the reasons given above, that this is the only question Alston means to 
8This may involve once again the error noted earlier: since he confuses practical ratio-
nality with prudential justification, Turri may not recognize that known unreliability is a 
defeater for practical rationality.
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address with his Moore’s Paradox argument. But regardless of that, now 
that Turri has come around to considering the question, what does he 
make of it? Alston states,
It is irrational to engage in SP, to form beliefs in the ways constitutive of that 
practice, and refrain from acknowledging them as true, and hence the prac-
tice as reliable, if the question arises. (A179)
In this case, says Turri, 
the analogy with Moore’s Paradox should consist of the following proposi-
tions:
(15') It is practically rational for me to engage in α.
(16') I believe that α is reliable [or: α gives rise to mostly true beliefs].
But there is no pragmatic implication here either. Suppose Smith recognizes 
that he has overwhelming practical reason to engage in α, thus assenting to 
(15’). Now suppose that the canons of α make no pretension to reliability. 
The guiding epistemic principle of α is to believe in accordance with the 
available evidence. Yet the canons of α also caution that we have no evi-
dence whatsoever that believing in accordance with the evidence is robustly 
truth-conducive. . . . In other words, we have no evidence that evidence is 
reliable, so we should suspend judgment on whether α is reliable. Accord-
ingly, Smith denies (16’). Yet Smith is not thereby epistemically irrational. 
(T294)
Here Turri seems to have forgotten that α is supposed to be a doxastic—
that is, a belief-forming—practice. Now, believing a proposition is equiva-
lent to believing that the proposition is true (given that we, like Alston, un-
derstand truth and belief in a realistic way). So in the envisaged scenario 
we have Smith forming a large number of beliefs by engaging in α—that 
is, there are a large number of propositions he has arrived at by following 
α, concern ing each of which Smith believes that the proposition in ques-
tion is true—and yet he demurs from the claim that α gives rise to mostly 
true beliefs. If that isn’t irrational, what does it take?
Perhaps the most charitable way to view this situation is to suppose 
that Smith’s attitude towards the propositions in question is one not of 
belief but rather of acceptance. That is to say, he will include these proposi-
tions in his theories, will draw inferences from them, and may in many 
contexts act as if he thought them true, but in fact he has no positive belief 
one way or the other as to their actual truth. His attitude thus resembles 
that of some scientific anti-realists toward the propositions delivered by 
scientific inference. If so, there need be no irrationality on Smith’s part. 
But then the status of α as a doxastic practice needs to be re-examined. If 
the attitude Smith takes towards the propositions generated by α is the 
one recommended by α itself, then α is not, properly speaking, a doxastic 
practice at all; perhaps we could term it an “acceptance practice.” If on 
the other hand α does recommend that the propositions it generates be 
believed, we must conclude that Smith isn’t actually following α; perhaps 
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we could say that he is following “quasi-α.”9 (And here his attitude may 
resemble that of some who engage in religious practices, whose attitude 
towards religious doctrines is one of acceptance rather than of belief.)
Either way, however, we must conclude that Turri’s critique of Alston’s 
Moore’s Paradox argument is a failure. And since that is the case, his 
attack on Alston’s premise (2) also fails. To be sure, this does not mean 
that Alston’s overall argument is home free. There are many additional 
points at which his argument can be questioned—and of course, has been 
questioned. But premise (2) is secure against Turri’s attacks. One cannot 
adopt a belief-forming practice and use it to arrive at many beliefs one re-
gards as true, and yet rationally deny that the practice is truth-conducive 
and reliable.10
Huntington University
9There may be a third possibility: perhaps the “canons of α” contain both the injunction 
to believe the propositions delivered by α and also the stipulation that we should suspend 
judgment on whether α is reliable. In that case, the practitioner of α, if he wishes to remain 
rational, is forced to choose which of these instructions to accept.
10My thanks to the editor and to two unnamed referees for helpful comments on an earlier 
version of this paper.
